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DESIGN DEFECT LIABILITY: IN SEARCH OF
A STANDARD OF RESPONSmILITY
MARY J. DAVISt

INTRODUCTION

Responsibility! for the consequences of our own actions and
occasionally for the actions of others seems to have been largely
forgotten as a foundation for governing conduct. This Article
advocates re-emphasizing responsibility in one important area, that
of manufacturer2 liability for product design. To that end, I

t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law;
B.A., 1979, University of Virginia; J.D., 1985, Wake Forest University. This
Article, in an earlier draft, was the subject of a colloquium presentation by the
author to the faculty of the University of Kentucky in October 1992 at which
many valuable suggestions were received.
1. The term "responsibility" has many different meanings. Black's Law
Dictionary defines it as "[t]he state of being answerable for an obligation, and
includes judgment, skill, ability and capacity.... The obligation to answer for an
act done, and to repair or otherwise make restitution for any injury it may have
caused." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979). It includes the elements
of reliability and trustworthiness. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1005 (1987). Of course, responsibility in a moral or political sense is more
difficult to derme than the legal sense in which the term is used in this Article.
For two excellent discussions of the larger role that responsibility should play in
our tort system, see Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability
Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 895-908, and
Timothy T. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: A wareness, Participation,
and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 470 (1993).
2. Using the term "manufacturer" implies similarities in all manufacturers
when their only real similarity is the manufacture and distribution of some product.
When we hear the word "manufacturer," we think of companies with employment
rolls in the thousands and very sophisticated design, engineering, manufacturing
and marketing systems. Not every manufacturer, however, is General Motors
Corporation. This Article uses the term "manufacturer" to include any entity that
makes a product for consumption by the public and recognizes that the vast
majority of product producers are not monolithic entities but are of much more
moderate character.
When referring to manufacturers throughout this Article, I use personal
pronouns, i.e., "he," "she" or "they." Personalizing these companies serves a
purpose. Identifying a company as a person assigns qualities to it that only thinking,
feeling humans can have. These qualities include the ability to make value judgments
with integrity, honesty, morality, and responsibility. To forget that corporations
1217
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propose the highest standard of conduct by which to judge product
manufacturers' design decisions. The standard I propose is higher
than merely reasonable, prudent conduct and is not the allegedly
"strict" liability frequently imposed. The standard this Article
proposes reflects an emphasis on responsible conduct in light of
the special relationship of trust that exists between manufacturers
and their customers.
During the last four decades, courts have made great strides
in overturning ancient barriers to injured claimants' recovery in
products liability actions. Courts have accomplished this by shifting
away from rigid negligence and contract-based liability systems to
a system of strict tort liability. 3 Critics of the current liability
system would disagree with the characterization of those changes
as "strides" because that word implies positive achievements. 4 The

are nothing more than the humans who run them is to ignore that they are capable
of making all of the conscious choices about how to organize and structure their
"lives" that each of us does: decisions about the nature of their conduct, the
quality of their work, how they want to be respected and perceived, and the real
effect of their decisions on others.
3. Many scholars have written on the evolution of products liability, its
history and its purposes. Some of the most renowned examples of this scholarship,
which were instrumental in forging the changes alluded to and discussed throughout
this Article are: Francis H. Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other
Than Their Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. REv. 343 (1929); Fleming James, Jr.,
Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REv. 192 (1955); W. Page Keeton, Products
Liability-Some Observations about Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329
(1966); Dix. W. Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use
of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962); Dix. W. Noel, Mtlnufacturers of ProductsThe Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963 (1957); William L. Prosser,
The Assault on the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); and Richard G. Wilson, Products Liability:
The Protection of the Injured Person, 43 CAL. L. REv. 614 (1955).
For a discussion of the goals strict products liability was intended to achieve,
see infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the history of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT § 402A],
which is the culmination of some of this scholarship and the foundation for modern
strict products liability, see infra notes 47 to 59 and accompanying text.
4. Even early on there were many opponents of the movement toward strict
liability for product-related injures. See, e.g., Marcus L. Plant, Strict Liability of

Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View,
24 TENN. L. REv. 938 (1957).
Most of the criticism has come in the last two decades by those who perceive
the changes in standards of liability as going too far toward a system of pure
wealth redistribution that promotes neither safety nor quality in product manufacture and neither economic efficiency nor wealth maximization. See generally WrL-
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American Law Institute (ALI) recently completed a study on the
current state of products liability law which thoroughly discussed
the bases of the insurance crisisS of the 1980s and offered a general
critique of the products liability system. 6 The ALI Reporters'
Study, as it is known, met with much criticism. 7 However, because

M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
(1987); Richard A. Posner, A Theory oj Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972);
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
5. The existence of the "insurance crisis" and its causes are the subject of
some debate. See Scott E. Harrington, Liability Insurance: Volatility in Prices and
in the Availability oj Coverage, in TORT LAW AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST, 47-49
(peter H. Shuck, ed. 1991). Compare PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988) and George L. Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1566 (1987) with
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation jor Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1991).
Scholars and other observers of the current products liability system seem to
agree generally on the need for reform. See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1-13 (1991); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Stargazing: The Future oj American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1332 (1991) [hereinafter Henderson and Twerski, Stargazing]; George L. Priest,

LIAM

The Invention oj Enterprise Liability: A Critical History oj the Intellectual Foundations oj Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
State legislatures have been instrumental in bringing about certain pro-defendant changes including, for example, statutes of repose, product misuse and
alteration defenses, and rebuttable presumptions of no defect with proof of
compliance with governmental regulations or industry practice. See generally Joseph
Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Ojj to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Rejorm Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207 (1990); Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the

Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Deject Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law oj Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521,
524-25 n.15 (1982) [hereinafter Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground].
6. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE REsPONSmILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY, REpORTERS' STUDY, VOLS. I AND II (1991) [hereinafter ALI REPORTERS'
STUDY].
7. This controversial Study was not adopted by the ALI Council, but is
instead considered a report to the council. See Kenneth Jost, Rarefied Atmosphere
Masks High Stakes, Deep Passions: ALI turns to Tort Rejorm, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr.
27, 1992, at 1. For a critique of the ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, see Stephen D.
Sugarman, A Restatement oj Torts: American Law Institute Reporters' Study,
Enterprise Responsibility jor Personal Injury, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1992).
The Chief Reporter for the ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, Paul C. Weiler, of
Harvard University Law School, explained the study's conclusion that the insurance
crisis is "more directly attributable to capital problems on the insurance side of
the tort regime, not to an explosion of spurious claims," but there was an increase
in liability imposition on the "wrong defendants" and "inadequate compensation
for real victims." ALI Tests Waters oj Tort Rejorm, 59 U.S.L.W. 2707 (May 28,
1991).
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the ALI is now in the process of preparing a Restatement (Third)
of Torts which will include a substantial section on products
liability, 8 both critics and advocates of the current system have a
golden opportunity to press their positions and affect the next
generation of products liability law. 9 To that end, this Article
argues that the determination of liability for design defects should
be made in a negligence-based action and should focus on the
manufacturer's conduct by raising the standard of care to the
highest level possible.
The current system of products liability attempts to deal with
all types of injury-causing product defects lO in the same waysusing negligence, warranty and strict liability as the three bases of
establishing liability. Admittedly, strict liability is the prominent
basis of liability for all types of product defects and is not
necessarily limited to the simple manufacturing or production flaw
which prompted the adoption of Restatement (Second) of Torts

8. Product Safety and Liability, 60 U.S.L.W. 2764 (June 9, 1992).
9. Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski were named
as co-reporters for the Products Liability section of the planned Restatement (Third).
One of their key responsibilities will be "to steer a divergent group of scholars
and practitioners toward completion of the influential study, which is expected to
take about five years to complete." ld.; see also Already on the Record, LEGAL
TIMEs, June 8, 1992, at 3 (reporting allegations that Professors Henderson and
Twerski are pro-business in philosophy and financially backed by business concerns,
thereby tainting the objectivity of the Restatement (Third». Professors Henderson
and Twerski have already re-written section 402A in a recent article. James A.
Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512 (1992) [hereinafter
Henderson and Twerski, A Proposed Revision].
10. This Article does not address liability for manufacturing flaws, those
production defects which make the offending product different from the manufacturer's specifications. The premise of this Article is, in part, that the history of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A and the adoption of strict liability
that evolved from Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944), both impose liability for manufacturing flaws.
Design defect litigation did not come to fruition until the 1970s and 1980s and was
not intended to be enveloped by section 402A, even by its creators. See infra notes
49-59 and accompanying text.
Product defects arising from alleged failures-to-warn have occasionally been
included within the rubric of strict liability, as in comment j to Restatement §
402A, but are generally considered negligence-based in theory. These claims similarly
will not be addressed in this Article. For a discussion of failure to warn litigation,
see James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265 (1990) and
Aaron D. Twerski, et aI., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products LiabilityDesign Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976).
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section 402A.1l However, when the more complicated litigation
over allegedly defective generic product designs earnestly began in
the early 1970s, it became increasingly clear that strict liability
definitions of "defect" were inadequate to deal with the complexities of manufacturers' conscious design decisions. 12
In seeking to embrace all product defect claims under the
scheme of strict liability, courts developed several theories to justify
strict liability for design flaws. 13 In most instances, courts have
tried in vain to explain the substantive distinction between negligence and the theory of strict liability used for assessing design
defects, which supposedly focuses on the condition of the product
and not the conduct of the manufacturer that created that condition.14 In their attempts to justify imposing strict liability on what

11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter section
402A]. For a discussion of the history of the adoption of section 402A, see infra
notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
13. Strict products liability has been variously defined, but most jurisdictions
follow a version which closely adheres to the language of section 402A or the
liability as it has evolved in California through Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) and Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal.
1972), which expressly disagreed with the section 402A approach because it "rings
of negligence." ld. at 1162. See infra notes 60-116 and accompanying text.
A few isolated jurisdictions impose what may be more properly called absolute
liability: liability regardless of any evaluation of whether the danger is unreasonable
or whether the product is defective. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (imposing absolute liability on asbestos product
manufacturers for failure to warn by imputing knowledge of all dangers regardless
of scientific knowledge at the time of manufacture); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co.,
Inc., 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (pa. 1978) (purporting to follow section 402A but
imposing liability based, in part, on a manufacturer's effective guarantee of his
products).
14. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
similarity between strict liability for design defects and negligence liability, see
Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 V AND. L. REv. 593 (1980); James
A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLlJM.
L. REv. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter Henderson, Manufacturers'Design Choices]; James
A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design:
Toward Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1979)
and James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1263 (1991) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Rejection of Liability Without

HeinOnline -- 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1221 1992-1993

1222

THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1217

is essentially a conduct-based evaluation, these courts unfortunately
ignore the importance of focusing on the manufacturers' responsibility to the consuming public, one of the primary foundations
of early strict products liability.
This Article does not advocate a return to evaluating manufacturers' conduct by the negligence principles as they existed prior
to the advent of strict liability, though that is what some advocate.tS
The standard of care required must be heightened both to reflect
the advances in consumer protection and product safety brought
by the struggle of the last decades and, more importantly, to
comport with the public's demand for manufacturer responsibility.
Recognizing a heightened standard of care owed by product manufacturers in the design of their products will strike an appropriate
balance between the conduct society expects and the conduct
manufacturers can and should provide.
A heightened level of care which specifically incorporates a
recognition of responsibility to the consuming public will address,
in part, the public demand that institutions of power and authority
acknowledge their responsibility and obligation. 16 Currently, and
perhaps throughout the reform period, the public conscience seems
to seek to achieve different goals through the tort liability system
than those which courts and scholars attribute to the system:
namely pure compensation, efficiency and risk distribution. 17 The

Defect].
Even the primary author of the risk-utility test for evaluating design defects
in strict liability, Professor John W. Wade, recognizes that his is basically a
negligence test. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U: L. REv. 734, passim (1983) [hereinafter
Wade, Effect of Knowledge]; John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 836-37 (1973) [hereinafter Wade, Strict Tort
Liability]; John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability,
33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 566-569 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Henderson and Twerski, A Proposed Revision, supra note 9,
at 1514 (proposing liability for design defects "only if the foreseeable risks of harm
presented by the product when and as marketed could have been reduced at
reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of a safer design .... ").
16. See, e.g., Solve Crisis of Confidence, PUBUC RELATIONS JOURNAL 23
(Jan. 1992) ("People are angry. Credible polls show that the majority of Americans
no longer trust government or politicians and are increasingly cynical and contemptuous toward business. ").
17. For a discussion of the efficiency goals of tort law, see GUIDO A.
CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 17-21
(1970); and RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-24 (4th ed. 1992).
But see James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical
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public seems to instead seek an acknowledgement of the responsibility it is owed by product manufacturers by virtue of the
relationship of trust and confidence that exists between themselves
and manufacturers.
Product manufacturers recognize the public desire for quality
and safety, as evidenced by advertising campaigns that encourage
consumers to believe both in them and their products. IS This
Article proposes a standard which requires compliance with those
assurances of quality in the design context. It advocates the
highest standard of care achievable in the product design choices
made because of the special responsibility owed to consumers.
Often, the injured claimant primarily seeks an acknowledgement
by the offending product's manufacturer that he failed in his
responsibility; a portrayal of some sense of remorse for marketing a product which the consumer trusted but which led to
injury. However, product manufacturers often view injured
claimants' attempts to obtain redress simply as spurious efforts
to get money to which the claimants are not entitled. Product
manufacturers vehemently believe in the excellence of their products and feel wrongly assaulted by attempts to disparage those

Analysis oj Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1570, 1589-94
(1991) [hereinafter Henderson, Judicial Reliance] (of the major types of policy
rationales identified in product liability decisions, fairness led efficiency in frequency
in justifying the decisions). For a discussion of the goals and policies behind strict
products liability, see David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies oj Strict Products
Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980) [hereinafter Owen, Rethinking the Policies].
In addition, Professor Owen has recently attempted to expound on the moral and
political philosophy that forms the basis of products liability. David G. Owen, The
Moral Foundations oj Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 427 (1993) [hereinafter Owen, Moral Foundations]. Professor Owen
acknowledges the importance of the special relationship between manufacturer and
consumer in defining those principles. ld. at 429-30, 436, 473.
18. For a discussion of this representational basis for product manufacturer
liability, see Leon Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade
oj Litigation, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1185 (1976); and Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory oj Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability
For Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974) [hereinafter Shapo, A
Representational Theory]. Furthermore, a recent article in the Washington Post
reported on the new age of commercial altruism as a marketing technique. Don
Oldenburg, Socially Correct Marketing: Many Firms Are Coming up With <tBig
Cause" Ads, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, at C5. See also Paul J. Schloemer, Let's
Get America Back to Business, INDUSTRY WEEK, April 6, 1992, at 34 (U.S.
manufacturers need to make further progress in quality of processes and products
to meet "the stringent requirements now imposed by virtually all customers, at
home and abroad.").
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products. 19 Thus, the participants in the products liability process
seem to have a fundamental misunderstanding about each other's
motives; a misunderstanding which ignores the essential nature
of the other participants' relationship to that process.
This Article proposes a standard of liability based on the
high responsibility product manufacturers have to the less informed and necessarily trusting public. Part I supports this
standard by identifying the general goals of product liability law.
Part II explores the history of how we came to a strict liability
system to fulfill those goals. Part III defines the current system
of imposing liability for product design defects and shows that
this system is not one of strict liability as was originally intended,
but is rather one of negligence which focuses on the manufacturer's conduct in design decisions. Once it becomes evident that
design defect liability is properly based on negligence, a reassessment of the standard of conduct to be imposed on product
manufacturers is in order.
To establish the proper standard, Part IV elaborates on the
foundation of product manufacturer responsibility and compares
the relationship between product manufacturers and their customers to that which exists between other categories of responsible actors and their victims where, because of the relationship,
the responsible actor is held to the highest standard of care possible.

19. See Milton R. Copulos, An Rx for the Product Liability Epidemic,
FOUND. REpORTS (May 15, 1985) (reporting manufacturer response at
onslaught of products claims); see also Product Liability: Executives Say Lawsuits
Have Forced Firms to Manufacture Safer Products, BNA DAILY REpORT FOR
EXECUTIVES (Jan. 7, 1988) (many executives believe lawyers and consumer activists
are responsible for liability crisis and that consumers should assume greater risks).
Notwithstanding the asbestos products manufacturers' early knowledge of the
health hazards of asbestos, see Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), and the knowledge of the
A.H. Robins Company about the significant hazardous side effects of the use of
the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device for birth control, see Palmer v. A.H. Robins
Co., 684 P.2d 187, 196-98 (Colo. 1984), the vast majority of products liability
cases, particularly design defect cases, involve manufacturers who, generally, are
interested in the safety of their products. At the risk of being criticized for including
anecdotal evidence, personal experience in six years of product liability defense
representation for a variety of manufacturers, large and small, teIls me this is so.
These manufacturers believe they are acting responsibly when they make the design
decisions they do. Yet when asked why they did not implement a safety feature,
they typica1Iy complain about the practical problems and expense, regardless of the
amount of that expense.
HERITAGE
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Common carriers,2° bailors for hire,21 innkeepers,22 and commercial providers of dangerous services,23 among others,24 are generally required to exercise the highest degree of care possible in
their conduct. 2s Because of the element of control by one actor
over the activity, the inherent trust in that control by other
participants in the activity. the dangerousness of the activity,
and the high probability of serious harm to unsuspecting persons
when responsible care is not exercised, this Article analyzes the
relationships between common carriers and passengers, and between commercial providers of dangerous services and the public
in an effort to discover what sets these relationships apart from
others where conduct is judged simply by the standard of the
"reasonable and prudent person."
The primary factor that distinguishes these relationships is
trust. This trust brings with it a duty to behave not only reasonably
but responsibly. Responsible conduct reflects an obligation to
behave in a way that takes into account the interests of a category
of other participants who are not only less knowledgeable, but
who are incapable of becoming knowledgeable about the risks
involved in an activity. The relationships identified above involve
these participants-the passenger of the carrier and the user of,
or member of the public affected by, the dangerous commercial
service. So stands the consumer of a product to the manufacturer
of that product. A relationship exists which was cultivated by the
manufacturer, encouraged by necessity, marketing and advertising,
and culminated in the use by the consumer of the manufacturer's
product. The above relationships are unique because of the inter20. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880); see also infra
notes 126-158 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Goldman v. Phantom Freight, Inc., 413 N.W.2d 433 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987), leave to appeal denied, 429 Mich. 867 (1987).
22. See, e.g., Tobin v. Slutsky, 506 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1974); Franklin v.
Paul DuPuis & Assocs., 543 So.2d 970 (La. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 545
So.2d 1042 (La. 1989).
23. See, e.g., Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc., 642 P.2d 36 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1981), afpd, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984) (supplier of liquified petroleum gas);
Wooten v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 477 So.2d 1142 (La. Ct. App. 1985)
(electric utility); see also infra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Hanson v. Christensen, 145 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. 1966) (public
swimming resort operator held to high degree of care); Fantini v. Alexander, 410
A.2d 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (karate instructor held to standard of
care of a professional in the field).
25. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS,
§ 34, at 208-209 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS].
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dependence of the actors-the product manufacturer is dependent
on the consuming public for its existence and the consumer relies
on the sophistication of the manufacturer to make its products in
such a way that they will not be unduly harmful. Because of that
relationship, the highest standard of care should be required. This
standard is responsible conduct. Part IV contains an explanation
of how this high standard of care will apply, suggests a jury
instruction to implement the standard, and provides examples of
how the standard will affect a variety of cases.
1.

THE GOALS OF TORT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS

Much has been written on what the ultimate goals of a system
of civil, as opposed to criminal, liability should be. 26 There are a
variety of goals and sub-goals behind tort liability, but there is
general agreement that two primary categories of goals exist. 27 The
first is the fairness/rightness category of goals, which reflects the
belief that tort liability should be considered a means of redressing
the past wrong inflicted on one by another, regardless of how that
wrong is ultimately defined.28 The fairness goal recognizes a socie-

26. For a discussion of the distinction between public & private law in the
torts context, see Leon Green, Tort Law: Public Law in Disguise (PIS. 1 & 2), 38
TEx. L. REv. 1, 257 (1959-60). A recent symposium on the debate over the
corrective versus the distributive justice foundations of private and public law, and
the relationship to tort law in particular, is presented in Symposium: Corrective
Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's Neighbor, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1863 (1992).
27. The ALI Reporters' Study undertakes a full evaluation of the goals of
tort liability and the different systems available to achieve those goals. ALI
REpORTERS' STUDY, supra note 6, Vol. 1, at 23-33. For an empirical analysis of
the policy on which courts rely in making product liability decisions, see Henderson,
Judicial Reliance, supra note 17.
28. See OUYER W. HOLMES, JR. THE COMMON LAW 77-80 (Little, Brown &
Co. ed., 1923) (1881); see also George W. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972). This category of goals personifies the values
of corrective justice. See generally Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations oj
Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992); Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REv. 625 (1992).
HoImes is the chief advocate of the position that tort liability for personal
injuries is grounded in fault, which is the failure to exercise that amount of care
that society requires of us in conducting our activities. See HOLMES, supra at 111;
see also Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility
Jor Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315 (1894). Others have criticized
HoImes' and the nineteenth century theorists' conclusion. Tort liability for personal
injuries, according to recent revisionists, is non-fault based; i.e., one acts at his
peril and is liable for injuries directly caused. See 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING
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